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The Winner of the US-China Tariff War? The Global South

There is always an opportunity in every conflict.

Inspiration: China Decode podcast, How Labubus Explain China’s Global Reach

You might be asking yourself, “why would a performance marketer write about global trade”.

In most circumstances, you would be correct.

But, once you get to a point at your marketing career, you realize that market condiitons matter more than your own performance.

Meaning, many of us think we are doing better than we actually are when the market conditions are great, then are also quick to blame ourselves when the conditions are not ideal.

As the quote goes, “everyone is a genius in a bull market”.

Let’s Get Some Data

First, this is not something recent.

Between 2017 and 2022, China’s share of US imports fell by 6 percentage points, from 22% to 16%. 

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has surged into these alternative manufacturing hubs.

The ASEAN region, for example, saw its annual FDI inflows nearly double to $60.8 billion in 2018, the year the trade war began.

Countries like Vietnam, Mexico, and India have become primary destinations for companies seeking to de-risk their supply chains and circumvent punitive tariffs, a strategy now widely known as “China + 1” or “nearshoring.”

This was done by your favourite brands like Apple (one of the biggest flexes Tim Cook has done, that is not seen by most consumers).

So, this shift can be simplified into three folds.

Trade Diversion, where US importers substitute Chinese goods with products from countries like Vietnam and Mexico, leading to a surge in their exports.

Investment Relocation, where multinational corporations—including Chinese firms themselves—invest billions in new manufacturing capacity in these nations, fostering job creation and industrial growth.

Increased Market Competition, where the redirection of vast quantities of Chinese exports away from the US and towards other global markets creates downward price pressure.

Escalation Continues

The conflict began in early 2018 with US tariffs on specific products like solar panels and washing machines, before broadening with tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports from all countries, including China.

My hometown Türkiye also had its fair share of stress from this particular shift.

The primary escalation occurred in mid-2018 under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, when the US targeted an initial $50 billion worth of Chinese goods with 25% tariffs, citing unfair trade practices and intellectual property theft.

This list encompassed over 1,300 product categories, including high-tech goods like aircraft parts, medical devices, and batteries.

Don’t get me wrong, the IP theft was no joke, but the escalation started off quite rapidly since then.

As a quick clapback, China’s response was swift and symmetrical, imposing its own tariffs on American products, strategically targeting agricultural exports like soybeans and pork, as well as automobiles and airplanes.

Cute the Precious Folks

The trade war entered a new and more aggressive phase in 2025. In response to what it termed national security concerns, Beijing announced enhanced export controls on critical minerals, particularly rare earths, where it holds a near-monopoly on global processing, as well as on related technologies, synthetic diamonds, and high-performance lithium-ion batteries.

This move was perceived in Washington as a weaponization of China’s supply chain dominance. The US countermeasure was dramatic: President Donald Trump announced an additional 100% tariff on all Chinese goods, to be imposed on top of existing duties. This brought the average US tariff on Chinese imports to a staggering 58%, according to analysis by the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Moooooarrr Data…

The direct impact of the tariffs is most clearly visible in the sharp and sustained decline of China’s share of the US import market. According to a comprehensive analysis by the World Bank, China’s share of total US imports fell from a peak of 22% in 2017, the year before the trade war began, to 16% by 2022.

This aggregate decline is corroborated by more recent, high-frequency trade data. 

In September 2025, China’s exports to the United States fell by 27% compared to the same month the previous year.

This marked the sixth consecutive month of year-on-year decline, following an even sharper 33% drop in August 2025. This consistent downward trend demonstrates that the tariff pressure has successfully altered long-standing trade patterns.

 

The Rise of Alternative Exporters: The Global South Fills the Void

While its access to the US market was being curtailed, China’s export-oriented economy demonstrated remarkable resilience by successfully pivoting to new markets. In a stark illustration of this trade diversion, even as its exports to the US plummeted, China’s total global exports in September 2025 surged by 8.3% year-on-year, hitting a six-month high and significantly outpacing economists’ expectations. 

This growth was fueled by a strategic redirection of goods to other regions, particularly in the Global South. The data reveal a dramatic reorientation of China’s export focus:

The Investment Shift: Relocating Production and Capital

The rerouting of trade flows was accompanied by a more permanent and structurally significant shift: the relocation of physical production capacity and long-term capital investment. Faced with the prospect of enduring tariffs, multinational corporations began to move beyond temporary trade adjustments and undertake multi-billion-dollar decisions to build new factories and supply networks outside of China. This surge of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into nations in the Global South represents one of the most tangible and lasting benefits of the trade conflict, laying the groundwork for industrial expansion and job creation.

 

The “China + 1” Strategy and Nearshoring

Two dominant corporate strategies have guided the investment shift. The first is the “China + 1” strategy. In this risk-mitigation approach, companies diversify their manufacturing footprint by establishing new operations in a second country while often maintaining their existing presence in China. 

This allows them to serve the US market from the new location while continuing to leverage China’s vast domestic market and supply chain ecosystem for other purposes. 

The second, and increasingly prevalent, strategy is “nearshoring.” This involves relocating production facilities from distant locations like China to countries that are geographically closer to the final consumer market, principally Mexico for the North American market. 

Driven by a desire to shorten supply chains, reduce logistics costs and vulnerabilities, and navigate geopolitical tensions, nearshoring has been powerfully accelerated by the trade war and the supply chain disruptions experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic. For US-based companies, producing in Mexico offers the dual advantages of proximity and preferential market access under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). 

 

Tracking the Money: A Surge of FDI into the Global South

The tangible result of these strategies is a dramatic and measurable increase in FDI flowing into key developing nations, signalling a long-term commitment by global manufacturers to these new industrial hubs.

 

This flow of capital represents a more permanent economic shift than trade data alone. FDI in manufacturing involves multi-year commitments to build factories, train workforces, and establish local supply networks, indicating a structural rebalancing of global production that will have lasting economic consequences for the recipient nations.

 

The Chinese Capital Paradox: Funding the Competition

One of the most complex and revealing aspects of this investment shift is the active role played by Chinese companies themselves. Rather than passively losing out to competitors in other countries, many Chinese firms have become key drivers of the “China + 1” strategy, using their own capital to establish manufacturing bases in neighboring countries as a sophisticated method of tariff circumvention.

A detailed study by Harvard Business School on Vietnam’s manufacturing boom found that Chinese and Hong Kong-owned firms accounted for more than half of the “rerouting” activity induced by the trade war. Crucially, this increase was driven almost entirely by newly established firms. This indicates that Chinese capital was not simply acquiring existing Vietnamese companies but was purposefully building new factories in Vietnam with the primary goal of serving the US market and bypassing tariffs. 

A similar dynamic is unfolding in Mexico. Analysis by the Brookings Institution identifies Chinese FDI as a key pathway for circumventing US tariffs. Chinese-made components are imported into Mexico, incorporated into finished goods in newly established factories, and then exported to the US under the favorable terms of the USMCA. In 2020, approximately one-third of the value of Mexico’s exports comprised Chinese value-added content. 

This phenomenon demonstrates that the Global South’s manufacturing gains are, paradoxically, being funded and directed in part by Chinese corporate strategy. These nations are not simply replacing China; they are becoming more deeply integrated into its industrial ecosystem, serving as offshore final-assembly platforms. This allows the core of the value chain—often the more technologically advanced and higher-margin component production—to remain in China, while the tariff liability is shed in the final step of production.

The Price Question: A Buyer’s Market in the Global South?

A central premise for how US tariffs could benefit the Global South is the potential for consumers and businesses in these regions to gain access to Chinese goods at more competitive prices. While direct, comprehensive price index data is not available in the provided research, a strong economic inference can be drawn from the massive redirection of Chinese exports. The sudden loss of its largest single customer—the United States—forced China’s vast export machine to find new markets, likely creating a buyer’s market in the nations it pivoted towards.

China’s Export Pivot: From a Single Giant to a Global Portfolio

The scale of China’s export redirection is immense. As previously noted, while its shipments to the US were falling by double digits, its exports to other parts of the world were surging. The year-on-year growth in September 2025 alone—+15.6% to ASEAN, +15% to Latin America, and +56% to Africa—represents tens of billions of dollars in goods that needed to find new buyers. This was not a gradual market entry but a rapid, large-scale pivot driven by the necessity of keeping China’s factories running in the face of prohibitive US tariffs. This created an unprecedented supply shock in markets across the Global South.  

The Economics of Redirection: Supply, Demand, and Price Pressure

Basic economic principles suggest that such a significant and sudden increase in the supply of goods in a market will exert downward pressure on prices. Chinese manufacturers, facing a glut of inventory and idle capacity previously dedicated to the US market, would have been highly motivated to offer competitive pricing to penetrate new markets and secure market share quickly.

China’s fundamental competitive advantage amplifies this. As one senior economist at Natixis noted, the resilience of Chinese exports stems from their “low costs and limited choices for replacement globally”. Price competitiveness is the core of China’s export model. When faced with the need to sell massive volumes in new territories, it is logical to conclude that Chinese firms would leverage this primary strength, leading to lower prices for importers and, ultimately, consumers in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The influx of these low-cost goods would also increase competition for domestic producers and other international exporters in those markets, further contributing to a more favorable pricing environment for buyers.  

A Nuanced Assessment: The Double-Edged Sword of Low Prices

While the prospect of lower-priced goods is a clear benefit for consumers and for businesses that use Chinese products as inputs, it presents a more complex picture for the industrial development of Global South nations. The same influx of highly competitive Chinese goods that lowers prices can also pose a significant threat to local manufacturers.

This phenomenon, sometimes characterized as “dumping,” is already a point of contention in developed markets. As Chinese exports were diverted from the US, Europe saw a corresponding surge, particularly in sectors like solar panels, steel, and electric vehicles, leading to the bankruptcy of some European producers and calls for protective tariffs. The EU’s trade deficit with China has ballooned, reflecting the pressure on its domestic industries.  

For developing economies in the Global South, which are often trying to nurture nascent domestic industries, this challenge can be even more acute. A flood of low-cost Chinese consumer goods or industrial inputs could make it difficult for local firms in countries like India, Brazil, or Nigeria to compete, potentially stifling their growth. This creates a potential conflict: a country’s consumers may benefit from cheaper imports, while its own industrial policy goals are undermined. The “benefit” of lower prices could, in some cases, reinforce a dependency on Chinese manufacturing rather than fostering local self-sufficiency. Therefore, while the economic logic for a positive pricing effect is strong, the overall impact is nuanced and carries potential long-term costs for domestic industrialization.

Country Spotlights: Analyzing the Winners

The broad trends of trade and investment diversion have translated into concrete, measurable economic gains for several key countries in the Global South.

Vietnam, Mexico, and India, in particular, have emerged as primary beneficiaries, each leveraging unique strategic advantages to attract capital and grow their export-oriented manufacturing sectors.

Case Study: Vietnam – The Premier Beneficiary

Vietnam has been widely cited as the “biggest winner” of the US-China trade war, experiencing a dramatic economic boom driven by its proximity to China and its low-cost labour force.

 
Table 1: Economic Scorecard: Vietnam (Pre- vs. Post-Trade War)
Economic Indicator2017 Value (Pre-Tariffs)2022/2023 Value (Post-Tariffs)Change
GDP Growth Rate6.8%8.0% (2022)+1.2 percentage points
Exports to US$46.4 billion$127.5 billion (2022)+174.8%
FDI Inflow (Realized)$17.5 billion$22.4 billion (2022)+28.0%
Manufacturing Growth12.87%8.1% (2022)

Note: Data compiled from various sources reflecting pre- and post-trade war periods. 2022 data is used to show a mature post-tariff effect. Manufacturing growth was exceptionally high in 2017.

Case Study: Mexico – The Nearshoring Nexus

Mexico has capitalized on its geographic proximity to the United States and its preferential trade access under the USMCA to become the primary hub for the “nearshoring” phenomenon.

 

Table 2: Economic Scorecard: Mexico (Pre- vs. Post-Trade War)

Economic Indicator2017 Value (Pre-Tariffs)2023/2024 Value (Post-Tariffs)Change
GDP Growth Rate2.1%3.2% (2023)+1.1 percentage points
Exports to US$314 billion$475.6 billion (2023)+51.5%
FDI Inflow$31.7 billion$36.1 billion (2023)+13.9%
Manufacturing Output Growth-0.3%5.2% (2022)+5.5 percentage points

Note: Data compiled from various sources reflecting pre- and post-trade war periods. 2023 data is used where available to show the most recent impact. 19

 

Case Study: India – An Emerging Alternative

 

While not a direct geographic neighbor to China or the US, India has leveraged its large domestic market, growing labor force, and proactive government policies to position itself as a strategic long-term alternative for manufacturing.

  • Economic Resilience and Growth: Despite global headwinds from the trade war, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has consistently identified India as a key driver of global growth. The IMF projects India’s economy to expand by 6.6% in fiscal year 2026, citing its resilience, strong private consumption, and stable policy environment as key strengths that have allowed it to weather the disruptions better than many other economies.  

  • Foreign Direct Investment and Job Creation: India has made a concerted effort to attract manufacturing investment through flagship programs like “Make in India” and the Production-Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes. These efforts are bearing fruit. FDI equity inflow into the manufacturing sector saw a remarkable 76% increase in fiscal year 2021-22, reaching $21.34 billion. This investment is translating into jobs, with an estimated 8.5 million new employment opportunities created in the manufacturing sector between 2017-18 and 2022-23.  

  • Trade Diversification: While the US has also imposed some tariffs on Indian goods, which have negatively impacted sectors like textiles, India’s overall export performance has remained resilient due to successful diversification. India has increased its exports to other markets, including the UAE and even China, to offset declines in the US market. The electronics sector has been a particularly strong performer in India’s export basket. This demonstrates a growing capacity to compete in global markets and adapt to shifting trade dynamics.  

The distinct successes of Vietnam, Mexico, and India reveal that the benefits of the trade war are not uniform but are flowing to countries with specific, pre-existing strategic advantages. Vietnam’s win is based on its geographic integration with China’s supply chain. Mexico’s is based on its privileged trade access to the US market. India’s is based on its scale and ambition to become a self-sufficient industrial power. This influx of investment is also causing internal economic shifts, such as the concentration of growth in northern Vietnam near the Chinese border and in Mexico’s northern states, potentially creating new regional disparities within these beneficiary nations.  

 

Growing Pains: The Challenges of Unexpected Opportunity

 

The rapid influx of trade and investment, while overwhelmingly beneficial, is not without significant costs and risks. The very speed of this economic transformation is creating severe internal pressures on the infrastructure and labor markets of beneficiary nations. Moreover, the strategy of acting as a tariff workaround for Chinese goods exposes these countries to the significant geopolitical risk of becoming the next target in the ongoing trade conflict. These challenges threaten the long-term sustainability of the current boom.

 

Strained Infrastructure: The Race to Keep Up

 

The sudden surge in industrial activity is outpacing the development of essential public infrastructure, creating bottlenecks that could choke off future growth.

  • Vietnam: The country’s rapid industrialization has led to significant infrastructure challenges. Manufacturers face congested ports and road networks, which create costly logistical delays. Furthermore, the burgeoning factory sector is straining an inadequate power supply, leading to concerns about energy reliability and the ability to support continued expansion.  

  • Mexico: The nearshoring boom is placing immense demand on the country’s energy infrastructure. Experts warn of a worsening shortage of clean, reliable, and affordable electricity, as well as a lack of natural gas supply. These energy constraints are seen as a critical threat that could halt the nearshoring trend if not addressed, as modern manufacturing is highly energy-intensive.  

  • India: While the government has made significant investments in infrastructure, challenges remain. Logistics networks, including road and port efficiency, are still developing and can increase transit times and costs for manufacturers looking to integrate into global supply chains.  

These infrastructure deficits represent a critical hurdle. The FDI boom is happening now, but the solutions—building new power plants, highways, and ports—require massive, long-term capital investment and planning. A failure to bridge this gap could erode the cost-competitiveness that makes these locations attractive in the first place.

 

Regulatory and Labor Hurdles

 

Beyond physical infrastructure, beneficiary nations also face challenges related to their regulatory environments and the skill level of their workforce.

  • Vietnam: Businesses operating in Vietnam must navigate a complex and sometimes unpredictable legal and regulatory landscape. Ensuring compliance with international standards for labor rights, workplace safety, and product quality is a persistent challenge that requires significant oversight. Additionally, while the country has an abundant labor force, there is a growing shortage of workers with the high-level technical skills needed for the advanced manufacturing and automated processes that global firms are bringing.  

  • Mexico: A key challenge for Mexico is its relatively low labor productivity. Despite having lower wages than China, the output per worker in Mexico is significantly lower than in the US or Canada. To fully capitalize on the nearshoring of advanced manufacturing, which increasingly involves automation and complex processes, Mexico must invest heavily in upskilling and training its workforce to move up the value chain. 

The Transshipment Dilemma: Becoming the Next Target

Perhaps the most significant long-term risk for these beneficiary nations is that their success will make them the next target of US protectionism. The United States government is acutely aware that a significant portion of the trade shift is due to the circumvention of tariffs on China, a practice known as “transshipment.”

The Trump administration explicitly voiced this concern, dismissing exports from Southeast Asia as “little more than Chinese goods concealed and routed through third countries”. This perception has already translated into policy action. The US has threatened steep reciprocal tariffs on ASEAN nations, including rates as high as 46% for Vietnam and 49% for Cambodia—rates that rival those initially placed on China.  

This threat has been partially realized. The trade agreement reached between the US and Vietnam, which set a baseline tariff of 20% on Vietnamese goods, includes a crucial punitive clause: a 40% penalty tariff will be applied to any goods that the US considers to have been “transshipped”—that is, merely passed through Vietnam without substantial transformation—rather than being genuinely manufactured there.  

This places countries like Vietnam and Mexico in a strategic trap. Their economic boom is partly fueled by their effectiveness as a low-tariff conduit for China-centric supply chains. However, the more successful they are in this role, the more their trade surpluses with the US grow, and the more evidence of circumvention becomes apparent. This, in turn, increases their visibility as targets for US trade enforcement actions, which could neutralize the very advantage that drove the investment in the first place. The benefit contains the seed of its own destruction, creating a precarious foundation for sustained growth.

TLDR: A Precarious Boom and the New Rules of Global Trade

The economic conflict between the United States and China has unequivocally redrawn the map of global trade and manufacturing. The data and trends analyzed in this report lead to a clear conclusion: US tariffs have served as a powerful catalyst, diverting massive flows of trade and investment away from China and toward a select group of beneficiary nations in the Global South. This has created a significant, tangible economic boom for countries like Vietnam, Mexico, and India.

The gains are evident across multiple metrics. These nations have experienced accelerated GDP growth, a surge in manufacturing output, and a substantial increase in foreign direct investment, which has translated into millions of new jobs. They have successfully captured a portion of the US import market share lost by China and have become more deeply embedded in global value chains. The hypothesis that this shift would also lead to “better prices” for consumers and businesses in the Global South is supported by strong economic logic; the redirection of China’s vast export capacity has undoubtedly increased supply and intensified price competition in its new destination markets, even if the effect on local industries is a more complex matter.

However, this report must also conclude that these newfound benefits are both precarious and fraught with challenges. The economic boom is largely an external phenomenon, driven by geopolitical tensions rather than purely organic domestic growth. This dependency creates inherent vulnerabilities. The growth is contingent on a fragile geopolitical balance and the continued perception of these nations as viable, low-cost alternatives to China.

The internal strains are already showing. Rapid industrialization is outstripping the capacity of existing infrastructure, creating bottlenecks in energy and logistics that threaten to undermine the very cost advantages that attracted investment. Furthermore, the workforce in these countries must be rapidly upskilled to meet the demands of advanced manufacturing, a transition that requires long-term investment in education and training.

Most critically, the strategy of serving as a final-assembly hub for supply chains that still heavily rely on Chinese components is a double-edged sword. It is the engine of the current boom, but it is also the primary risk factor. As the United States and other Western nations become more focused on rooting out tariff circumvention and transshipment, the “winners” of the trade war could easily become its next targets.

Ultimately, the long-term success for these Global South nations will not be determined by their ability to capitalize on the current moment of opportunity alone. It will depend on their capacity to navigate these significant challenges and make the difficult domestic investments in infrastructure, education, and governance. The ultimate goal must be to transition from being merely convenient and temporary assembly hubs into resilient, innovative, and fully integrated economies capable of sustaining growth on their own terms.

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